CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/347
24 August 1971

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

MOROCCO

Working paper on drafts CCD/337* and CCD/338* on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction

1. Amend the text of the tenth preambular paragraph to read as follows:

"Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principle and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,".

2. (a) The international community should be notified of the execution of the provisions of article II by States Parties possessing bacteriological or toxin weapons as soon as they destroy them or divert them to peaceful purposes. The notice of that operation could be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, through him, to all States Parties.

(b) The term "population" in the last sentence of article II should be replaced by the plural "populations".

3. Insert a new article reading as follows:

"Each State Party to this Convention declares its intention to supply, within the limits of its ability, appropriate humanitarian assistance to another State Party which so requests and is exposed by another State, in violation of the provisions of the Convention, to danger resulting from deliberate use or accidental or chance dissemination of biological agents or toxins intended for military purposes".

4. There can be no doubt that the preparation of a viable convention completely and finally prohibiting bacteriological and toxin weapons requires that all States Parties shall be absolutely certain in law that the reservations formulated by many States to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 have been declared null and void with regard to the prohibition of the use of bacteriological and toxin weapons.

Failure to cancel those reservations would be likely to limit the very scope of the Convention and also to give rise to erroneous interpretations of article VII of documents CCD/337* and CCD/338*.

A legal solution should therefore be found for this problem.

5. It would be highly desirable to reach agreement, immediately after the entry into force of the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, on actual cessation of the production of chemical weapons.

CE.71-19192

71-18652